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Abstract
This paper deals with the revision of partially
ordered beliefs. It proposes a semantic repre-
sentation of epistemic states by partial pre-
orders on interpretations and a syntactic rep-
resentation by partially ordered belief bases.
Two revision operations, the revision stem-
ming from the history of observations and
the possibilistic revision, defined when the
epistemic state is represented by a total pre-
order, are generalized, at a semantic level, to
the case of a partial pre-order on interpreta-
tions, and at a syntactic level, to the case of a
partially ordered belief base. The equivalence
between the two representations is shown for
the two revision operations.
1 Introduction
Most of the time, an intelligent agent faces incomplete,
uncertain or inaccurate information. The arrival of a
new item of information, more reliable or more cer-
tain leads the agent to refine (specify) his beliefs, to
revise them. Belief revision is a well known problem
in Artificial intelligence [1], [9], [13], in this context,
an epistemic state encodes a set of beliefs about the
real world (based on the available information). An
epistemic state is generally interpreted as a plausibil-
ity ordering between possible states of the world, or
as a preference relation between information sources
from which an agent can derive his beliefs.
On a semantic level, epistemic states have been rep-
resented by a total pre-order on interpretations of the
underlying logical language [5]. This total pre-order
models the agent’s preferences between several situa-
tions. This pre-order has been encoded according to
several ways, ordinals [16], [17], possibilities [7], poly-
nomials [15].
However, the agent has not always a total pre-order
between situations at his disposal, but is only able
to define a partial pre-order between situations. The
arrival of successive items of information can help him
to refine this partial pre-order in order to converge to
a total pre-order between situations.
In other respects, total pre-orders are not suitable to
model the case where decision making is impossible or
not arbitrary. Suppose the agent has to make a deci-
sion on the cultivation of a new plot according to three
rules given by experts. A first rule, R1 specifies that if
some agronomical conditions hold (warm climate, deep
soil, acidity, etc...), called condition 1, then the cultiva-
tion of tobacco is feasible. The second rule R2 specifies
that if the agronomical conditions (condition 1) hold
and the zone is mildewed (mildew parasite could ruin
the plantation) called condition 2, then the cultivation
of tobacco is not feasible. The third rule R3 specifies
that according to the regulation of production of to-
bacco, if the area of the plot is not greater than the
authorized area, called condition 3, then the cultiva-
tion of tobacco is feasible.
The question is to define a pre-order on the three rules
in order to make a decision on the cultivation of to-
bacco. Since R2 is more specific than R1, it is natural
to prefer R2 over R1 (namely R2 < R1 holds). How-
ever, condition 3 is not related with condition 1 nor
with condition 2, then it seems reasonable to consider
R3 incomparable with R1 and R2. On contrast, if we
want to impose a total pre-oder on rules, we have to set
R3 relatively to R2, therefore there are two intuitive
choices, either R1 ≤ R3 or R3 ≤ R2. In the first case,
the following total pre-order holds: R2 < R1 ≤ R3 this
means that if condition 1, condition 2 and condition
3 are both satisfied, according to the total pre-order
we make the decision that the cultivation of tobacco
is not feasible. In the second case, the following total
pre-order holds: R3 ≤ R2 < R1 this means that if
condition 1, condition 2 and condition 3 are satisfied,
according to the total pre-order we make the decision
that the cultivation of tobacco is feasible. These two
total pre-orders lead to contradictory decisions, and
there is no reason to choose the first one or the second
one, the choice can only be arbitrary. Since we think
that arbitrary choices have to be excluded, we think
that a better solution is to consider R3 and R2 as in-
comparable (and hence all total pre-orders are consid-
ered), and thus to define a partial pre-order between
rules. In such cases, an epistemic state has to be rep-
resented by a partial pre-order on interpretations and
revision operations of partial pre-orders by formulas
have to be defined. Partial pre-orders on interpreta-
tions have been used to represent update operations
[12], this paper does not address updates but revisions.
In the present paper, we propose a generalization of
two revision operators to the case of partial pre-orders.
Section 2 presents the problematics of the representa-
tion of epistemic states by a partial pre-order and fo-
cuses on the difficulties of this generalization. Section
3 presents the generalization of the semantic revision
operations to partial pre-orders and the generalization
of the syntactic counterparts of these operations to
partially ordered belief bases. These generalizations
are rather direct. On contrast the generalization of
the mapping from the syntactic level to the seman-
tic level is more problematical as shown in Section 4,
because the definition of a partial pre-order between
formulas leads to two possible partial pre-orders be-
tween subsets of formulas. We choose one of them,
however the results presented hold for the other one.
We finally present the syntactic computation of the be-
lief set corresponding to an epistemic state in Section
5 before a concluding discussion in Section 6.
2 Presentation of the problem
2.1 Basic definitions of partial pre-orders
In this paper we use propositional calculus, denoted by
LPC , as knowledge representation language with usual
connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ≡ (logical equivalence). The
lower case letters a, b, c, · · ·, are used to denote propo-
sitional variables, lower case Greeks letters φ, ψ, · · ·,
are used to denote formulas, upper case letters A, B,
C, are used to denote sets of formulas, and upper case
Greeks letters Ψ, Φ · · ·, are used to denote epistemic
states. We denote by W the set of interpretations of
LPC and by Mod(ψ) the set of models of a formula ψ,
that is Mod(ψ) = {ω ∈ W , ω |= ψ} where |= denotes
the inference relation used for drawing conclusions.
A partial pre-order, denoted by  on a set A is a re-
flexive and transitive binary relation. Let x and y be
two members of A, the equality is defined by x = y
iff x  y and y  x. The corresponding strict partial
pre-order, denoted by ≺, is such that, x ≺ y iff x  y
holds but x  y does not hold. We denote by ∼ the
incomparability relation x ∼ y iff x  y does not hold
nor y  x.
 can equivalently be defined from = and ≺: a  b iff
a ≺ b or a = b.
Given  on a set A, the minimal elements of A are
defined by: min(A,) = {x : x ∈ A, 6 ∃y ∈ A, y ≺ x}
For the purpose of this paper, we need to define a
partial pre-order on subsets of elements of a set A.
According to Halpern’s works [10], [11] (see also Cayrol
et al. [4], Dubois et al. [6] and Lafage et al. [14]) there
are two meaningful ways to compare subsets of A. We
denote these two partial pre-orders on 2A by A,w and
by A,s.
Let X and Y be two subsets of A, The sets X and Y
are considered equals if for each preferred element inX
there exists a so preferred element in Y and conversely,
more formally:
Definition 1 Let X and Y be two subsets of A and
A a partial pre-order on A, X = Y iff :
∀x ∈ min(X,A), ∃y ∈ min(Y,A) such that x = y
and
∀y ∈ min(Y,A), ∃x ∈ min(X,A) such that x = y.
The first way to define a partial pre-order on subsets
X and Y of A is to consider that X is preferred to
Y if for each element of Y there exists at least one
element in X , which is preferred to it, more formally
(we assume that X and Y are not both empty):
Definition 2 X is weakly preferred to Y , denoted by
X ≺A,w Y , iff ∀y ∈ Min(Y,A), ∃x ∈ Min(X,A)
such that x ≺A y.
The second way to define a partial pre-order on subsets
X and Y of A is to consider that X is preferred to
Y if there exists at least one element in X which is
preferred to all elements in Y , more formally:
Definition 3 Let A be a partial pre-order on A
and X,Y ⊆ A. X is strongly preferred to Y , de-
noted by X ≺A,s Y iff ∃x ∈ Min(X,A) such that
∀y ∈Min(Y,A), x ≺A y.
It can be shown that the definition of ≺A,s implies the
definition of ≺A,w, namely, if X ≺A,s Y then X ≺A,w
Y . The converse does not hold.
Example 1 Let A = {x1, x2, y1, y2} and A be a par-
tial pre-order on A such that x1 A y1 and x2 A y2.
Let X and Y be two subsets of A, X = {x1, x2}
and Y = {y1, y2}, we have X ≺A,w Y , indeed x1 is
preferred to y1 and x2 is preferred to y2. However,
X ≺A,s Y does not hold, there is no element in X
which is preferred to all elements of Y .
In the case whereA is a total pre-order, the definition
of ≺A,s is equivalent to the definition of ≺A,w, more
formally, X ≺A,s Y iff X ≺A,w Y .
For lake of space, we will only focus on the weakly
preference definition. But all provided results are valid
for the strong preference.
2.2 Semantic representation of epistemic
states
Let Ψ be an epistemic state, Ψ is first represented
by a partial pre-order on interpretations, denoted by
Ψ. The interpretation ω is preferred (or more plau-
sible than) to ω′, denoted ω Ψ ω′. ω ∼Ψ ω′ de-
notes that the agent has no preference between ω and
ω′. The belief set corresponding to Ψ, denoted by
Belse(Ψ), modeling the agent’s current beliefs is such
that Mod(Belse(Ψ)) = min(W ,Ψ). We illustrate
this representation with the example informally de-
scribed in the introduction.
Example 2 The agent has to make a decision on the
cultivation of a new plot according tree rules given
by experts. A first rule, R1 specifies that if some
agronomical conditions hold (warm climate, deep soil,
acidity, etc...), called condition 1, then the cultivation
of tobacco is feasible. The second rule R2 specifies that
if the agronomical conditions (condition 1) hold and
the zone is mildewed (mildew parasite could ruin the
plantation) called condition 2, then the cultivation of
tobacco is not feasible. The third rule R3 specifies that
according to the regulation of the production of tobacco,
if the area of the plot is not greater than the authorized
area, called condition 3, then the cultivation of tobacco
is feasible. More formally, the three rules can be rep-
resented as follows: R1: b → a, R2: b ∧ c → ¬a, R3:
d → a, where a encodes the cultivation of tobacco is
feasible, b encodes condition 1, c encodes condition 2
and d encodes condition 3.
There are four propositional variables a, b, c and d.
The sixteen interpretations are ω0 = {¬a,¬b,¬c,¬d},
ω1 = {¬a,¬b,¬c, d}, ω2 = {¬a,¬b, c,¬d}, · · ·, ω14 =
{a, b, c,¬d}, ω15 = {a, b, c, d}. Let Ψ be an epistemic
state which corresponding belief set is Belse(Ψ) = (b→
a)∧ (b∧c→ ¬a)∧ (d→ a), we represent the epistemic
state by a partial pre-order, denoted Ψ as follows:
Since R2 is more specific than R1, and since R2 and
R3 are incomparable, then:
• the interpretations satisfying all constraints are
preferred to all other interpretations,
• the interpretations which falsify R2 are preferred
to the interpretations falsifying R1,
• the interpretations which falsify R2 and the ones
which falsify R3 are uncomparable.
The partial pre-order Ψ is represented by Figure 1
(an arrow x ←− y means x ≺ y, the transitivity and
the reflexivity are not represented for sake of clarity).
Figure 1: Representation of initial epistemic state Ψ
ω0 = ω2 = ω8 = ω9 = ω10 = ω11 = ω12 = ω13
ω1 = ω3 ω4 = ω6 ω5 = ω7
ω14 = ω15
2.3 Syntactic representation of epistemic
states
An epistemic state Ψ is syntactically represented by a
partially ordered belief base, denoted by Σ, where Σ
is a set of propositional formulas, and Σ is a partial
pre-order on Σ. Let φ and φ′ ∈ Σ, φ Σ φ′ means that
φ is preferred (more important than) to φ′ and φ ∼Σ
φ′ denotes that the agent has no preference between
φ and φ′. We illustrate this representation with the
example informally described in the introduction.
Example 3 Let Ψ be the epistemic state, where Σ =
{b→ a, b∧c→ ¬a, d→ a}, we represent the epistemic
state by a partial pre-order on Σ, denoted by Σ, as
follows: Since b ∧ c→ ¬a is more specific than b→ a,
and d → a and b ∧ c → ¬a are incomparable, the
following partial pre-order on formulas holds:
b ∧ c → ¬a ≺Σ b → a and b ∧ c → ¬a ∼Σ d → a and
b→ a ∼Σ d→ a.
The generalization of the representation and revision
of an epistemic state to a partial pre-order leads to the
following diagram:
Σ → Ψ
↓ ↓
Σ◦syµ → Ψ◦seµ
↓ ↓
Belsy(Ψ ◦sy µ) ≡ Belse(Ψ ◦se µ)
In the special case of a total pre-order, the diagram has
been shown valid and the equivalence between the syn-
tactic approach and the semantic approach has been
proved [2]. The question is what does remain true
when this diagram is extended to the representation
by a partial pre-order. We show in Section 3 that
we get the mappings Σ→Σ◦syµ , Ψ→Ψ◦seµ and
Ψ◦seµ→ Belse(Ψ ◦se µ) rather directly. On contrast,
the mappings Σ→Ψ and Σ◦syµ→ Belsy(Ψ ◦sy µ)
are less straightforward.
We now present the revision extended to a partial pre-
order.
3 Semantic and syntactic revision of
partial pre-orders
3.1 Extension of the revision stemming from
the history of observations
We extend the revision operation, defined in [2, 15],
to the case of partial pre-orders. The underlying in-
tuition stems from the fact that the agent remembers
all his previous observations. However these observa-
tions are not at the same level, according to whether
there are more plausible or not in the next epistemic
state. The general philosophy is that an old assertion
is less reliable than a new one. In prediction prob-
lems, it seems reasonable to decrease the confidence
that one has in an item of information, as time goes
by. However, this revision operation attempts to sat-
isfy as many previous observations as possible. That
is, an old observation persists until it becomes contra-
dictory with a more recent one. The revision operation
uses the history of the sequence of previous observa-
tions to perform revision.
3.1.1 Semantic extension
When an epistemic state, Ψ, is represented by a partial
pre-order on interpretations, the revision of Ψ by a
propositional formula µ leads to a revised epistemic
state Ψ ◦se⊲ µ, represented by a partial pre-order on
interpretations. This new epistemic state is such that
the relative ordering between models of µ is preserved,
the relative ordering between counter-models of µ is
preserved, and the models of µ are preferred to its
counter-models. More formally:
Definition 4 Let Ψ be an epistemic state and µ be a
propositional formula, the revised epistemic state Ψ◦se⊲
µ corresponds to the following partial pre-order:
• if ω, ω′ ∈Mod(µ) then ω Ψ◦se
⊲
µ ω
′ iff ω Ψ ω′,
• if ω, ω′ 6∈Mod(µ) then ω Ψ◦se
⊲
µ ω
′ iff ω Ψ ω′,
• if ω ∈ Mod(µ) and ω′ 6∈ Mod(µ) then ω ≺Ψ◦se
⊲
µ
ω′.
According to this definition it is easy to check that
Mod(Belse(Ψ ◦se⊲ µ)) = min(Mod(µ),Ψ).
Example 4 We come back to example 2, where the
initial epistemic state Ψ is represented by the Figure 1.
The corresponding belief set Belse(Ψ) is such that
Mod(Belse(Ψ)) = {ω0, ω2, ω8, ω9, ω10, ω11, ω12, ω13}.
Suppose we learn that condition 3 holds, namely we re-
vise Ψ by the propositional formula µ = d. According
to the definition 4 the revised epistemic state Ψ◦se⊲ is
represented by the partial pre-order on interpretations
Ψ◦se
⊲
graphically represented on Figure 2.
Figure 2: Representation of Ψ ◦se⊲ µ
ω0 = ω2 = ω8 = ω10 = ω12
ω4 = ω6
ω14
ω9 = ω11 = ω13
ω1 = ω3 ω5 = ω7 ω15
Mod(¬µ)
Mod(µ)
The belief set corresponding to Ψ ◦se⊲ µ is such that
Mod(Belse(Ψ ◦se⊲ µ)) = {ω9, ω11, ω13} and since
Mod(µ) = {ω1, ω3, ω5, ω7, ω9, ω11, ω13, ω15}, it can be
checked that
Mod(Belse(Ψ ◦se⊲ µ)) = min(Mod(µ),Ψ).
3.1.2 Syntactic extension
We now present the syntactic extension of this revision
operation to partial pre-orders. Let Ψ be an epistemic
state, Ψ is syntactically represented by a partially or-
dered belief base, denoted by Σ, where Σ is a set of
propositional formulas, and Σ is a partial pre-order
on Σ. The revision of Σ by a propositional formula
µ leads to a partially ordered belief base denoted by
Σ◦sy⊲ µ as follows:
Let us denote by U the set of the disjunctions between
µ and the formulas of Σ, more formally, U = {φ ∨ µ,
such that φ ∈ Σ and φ ∨ µ 6≡ ⊤}.
Definition 5 Let Ψ be an epistemic state, represented
by a partially ordered belief base Σ, the revision of
Ψ by µ leads to a revised epistemic state Ψ ◦sy⊲ µ
represented by a partially ordered belief base where
Σ ◦sy⊲ µ = Σ ∪ U ∪ {µ} and Σ◦sy⊲ µ is such that:
• ∀φ ∨ µ ∈ U : φ ∨ µ ≺Σ◦sy⊲ µ µ,
• ∀φ ∈ Σ : µ ≺Σ◦sy⊲ µ φ,
• ∀φ, φ′ ∈ Σ : φ Σ φ′ iff φ Σ◦sy⊲ µ φ
′,
• ∀φ, φ′ ∈ Σ : φ Σ φ
′ iff φ ∨ µ Σ◦sy⊲ µ φ
′ ∨ µ.
Example 5 We come back to example 3. Let Ψ be the
epistemic state, where Σ = {b → a, b ∧ c → ¬a, d →
a}, Σ is such that it only contains one constraint:
b ∧ c→ ¬a ≺Σ b→ a.
Let us revise Ψ by the propositional formula µ = d.
According to the definition of the revision operation
◦sy⊲ , the revised epistemic state Ψ ◦
sy
⊲ µ is represented
by the following partial pre-order on Figure 3.
Figure 3: Representation of Ψ ◦sy⊲ µ
(b ∧ c→ ¬a) ∨ d
b→ a ∨ d
d
d→ a
b ∧ c→ ¬a
b→ a
Σ
µ
U
Remark that since (d → a) ∨ d is a tautology, we do
not take it into account.
3.2 Extension of possibilistic revision
We now present the extension of the possibilistic re-
vision to partial pre-orders. In a possibility theory
framework [6] an epistemic state Ψ is represented by
a possibility distribution π. Each interpretation is as-
signed with a real number belonging to the interval
[0, 1]. The value 1 means that the interpretation is
totally possible, whereas the value 0 means that the
interpretation is totally impossible. A possibility dis-
tribution induces a total pre-order ≤π on interpreta-
tions in the following way: ω ≤π ω
′ iff π(ω) ≥ π(ω′).
For more details on possibility theory and the revision
of possibility distributions, see [7, 8].
3.2.1 Semantic extension
Let Ψ be an epistemic state represented by a partial
pre-order ≤Ψ. The possibilistic revision of Ψ by a
propositional formula µ leads to a revised epistemic
state Ψ ◦seπ µ, represented by a partial pre-order on in-
terpretations, denoted by Ψ◦se
π
µ which considers that
all the counter-models of the new item of information
µ as impossible and preserves the relative ordering be-
tween the models of µ. More formally:
Definition 6 Let Ψ be an epistemic state and µ be a
propositional formula, the revised epistemic state Ψ◦seπ
µ corresponds to the following partial pre-order:
• if ω, ω′ ∈Mod(µ) then ω Ψ◦se
π
µ ω
′ iff ω Ψ ω′,
• if ω, ω′ 6∈Mod(µ) then ω =Ψ◦se
π
µ ω
′,
• if ω ∈ Mod(µ) and ω′ 6∈ Mod(µ) then ω ≺Ψ◦se
π
µ
ω′.
According to this definition it is easy to check that
Mod(Belse(Ψ ◦seπ µ)) = min(Mod(µ),Ψ).
Example 6 Let us consider again example 2.
We revise Ψ by the propositional formula µ = d. Ac-
cording to the definition 6, the revised epistemic state
Ψ◦seπ µ is represented by the following partial pre-order
on interpretations Ψ◦se
π
µ, graphically represented on
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Representation of Ψ ◦seπ µ
ω0 = ω2 = ω4 = ω6 = ω8 = ω10 = ω12 = ω14
ω9 = ω11 = ω13
ω1 = ω3 ω5 = ω7 ω15
Mod(¬µ)
Mod(µ)
The belief set corresponding to Ψ ◦seπ µ is such that
Mod(Belse(Ψ ◦seπ µ)) = {ω9, ω11, ω13}.
3.2.2 Syntactic extension
We now present the syntactic extension of the possi-
bilistic revision operation to partial pre-orders. Let Ψ
be an epistemic state, syntactically represented by a
partially ordered belief base. The revision of Σ by
a propositional formula µ leads to a partially ordered
belief base denoted by Σ◦syπ µ as follows:
Definition 7 The revision of Ψ by µ leads to a re-
vised epistemic state Ψ ◦syπ µ represented by a partially
ordered belief base Σ ◦syπ µ = Σ ∪ {µ} where Σ◦syπ µ is
such that:
• ∀φ ∈ Σ: µ ≺Σ◦syπ µ φ ,
• ∀φ, φ′ ∈ Σ: φ Σ φ′ iff φ Σ◦syπ µ φ
′.
Example 7 We come back to example 3, where Σ =
{b → a, b ∧ c → ¬a, d → a}, and  Σ only contains
one constraint: b ∧ c→ ¬a ≺Σ b→ a.
Let us revise Ψ by the propositional formula µ = d.
According to the definition 7, xthe revised epistemic
state Ψ ◦syπ µ is represented by the following partial
pre-order on Σ◦syπ µ denoted by Σ◦syπ µ and graphically
represented by Figure 5.
Figure 5: Representation of Ψ ◦syπ µ
d
d→ a
b ∧ c→ ¬a
b→ a
µ
Σ
Note that revising a partial pre-order, with ◦seπ and
◦se⊲ , carry away some incomparabilities. Hence, after
a certain number of successive revisions the resulting
partial pre-order on interpretations converges to a to-
tal pre-order on interpretations, more formally:
Proposition 1 Let Ψ be a partial pre-order on
interpretations, there exists a sequence of formulas
(µ1, µ2, · · · , µn) such that the resulting partial pre-
order after successive revisions
• (((Ψ ◦se⊲ µ1) ◦
se
⊲ µ2) ◦
se
⊲ · · · ◦
se
⊲ µn) is a total pre-
order, and
• (((Ψ ◦seπ µ1) ◦
se
π µ2) ◦
se
π · · · ◦
se
π µn) is a total pre-
order.
The interest of such a result stems from the fact that
starting from total ignorance about a topic, succes-
sive revisions lead to a partial pre-order on interpre-
tations, and we now know how to perform these revi-
sions. Moreover, after a certain number of revision the
partial pre-order converges to a total pre-order that
can be revised according to the results previously ob-
tained in [2], [7].
4 From syntax to semantics
We now present the mapping from a partially ordered
belief base Σ to a partial pre-order on interpretation
Ψ.
Definition 8 Let Σ be a partially ordered belief base
and ω be an interpretation. We denote by ⌈ω,Σ⌉ the
set of preferred formulas of Σ falsified by ω. We define
a partial pre-order on interpretations as follow:
ω Ψ,w ω
′ iff ⌈ω′,Σ⌉ Σ,w ⌈ω,Σ⌉.
Where Σ,w is given by definition 2
Example 8 We come back to example 3,where Σ =
{b → a, b ∧ c → ¬a, d → a}, and Σ is defined as
b ∧ c→ ¬a ≺Σ b→ a.
The sets of preferred formulas of Σ falsified by the in-
terpretations are the following:
⌈ω0,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω2,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω8,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω9,Σ⌉ = ∅,
⌈ω10,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω11,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω12,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω13,Σ⌉ = ∅,
⌈ω1,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω3,Σ⌉ = {d→ a},
⌈ω4,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω6,Σ⌉ = {b→ a},
⌈ω5,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω7,Σ⌉ = {b→ a, d→ a},
⌈ω14,Σ⌉ = ⌈ω15,Σ⌉ = {b ∧ c→ ¬a}.
According to definition of Σ,w, it can be easily checked
that the computation of Σ,w leads to the same partial
pre-order than the one used in the semantic represen-
tation of Ψ in example 2, namely Σ,w=Ψ.
We are now able to establish the equivalence between
the syntactic representation of epistemic states by
means of partially ordered belief bases and the seman-
tic representation of epistemic states by means partial
pre-orders on interpretations.
Theorem 1 Let Ψ be an epistemic state represented,
on one hand by a partially ordered belief base Σ and
on the other hand by a partial pre-orders on interpre-
tations Ψ. Let ◦
sy
⊲ and ◦se⊲ be the syntactic and se-
mantic revision operators stemming from the history of
the observations, and ◦syπ and ◦
se
π be the syntactic and
semantic possibilistic revision operators. Let we be the
mapping from a partially ordered belief base Σ to a
partial pre-order on interpretation Ψ. The following
result holds:
• we(Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ) = we(Σ) ◦se⊲ µ,
• we(Σ ◦
sy
π µ) = we(Σ) ◦
se
π µ.
We illustrate this theorem by the following example.
Example 9 Let Ψ be the epistemic state of example 3,
where Σ = {b→ a, b∧c→ ¬a, d→ a}, and Σ is such
that: b ∧ c→ ¬a ≺Σ b→ a.
According to example 5 the revised epistemic state
Ψ◦sy⊲ µ is represented by the partial pre-order on Σ◦
sy
⊲ µ
given by figure 3.
The sets of preferred formulas of Σ ◦sy⊲ µ = {b →
a, b ∧ c → ¬a, d → a, d, (b → a) ∨ d, (b ∧ c →
¬a) ∨ d, (d → a) ∨ d} falsified by the interpretations
are the following:
⌈ω9,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω11,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω13,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ∅,
⌈ω1,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω3,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {d→ a},
⌈ω5,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω7,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {b→ a, d→ a},
⌈ω15,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {b ∧ c→ ¬a},
⌈ω0,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω2,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω8,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ =
= ⌈ω10,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω12,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {d},
⌈ω4,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = ⌈ω6,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {(b→ a) ∨ d},
⌈ω14,Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ⌉ = {(b ∧ c→ ¬a) ∨ d}.
According to definition 4 it can be checked that
Ψ◦se
⊲
µ,w is identical to the one given by figure 3.
Since from example 8 we(Σ) =Ψ we have we(Σ
) ◦se⊲ µ =Ψ◦se⊲ µ and we(Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ) =Ψ◦se
⊲
µ,s it can
be checked that Ψ◦se
⊲
µ,s=Ψ◦se
⊲
µ, therefore we(Σ
◦sy⊲ µ) = we(Σ) ◦se⊲ µ and the equivalence between
syntactic representation and semantic representation
holds.
5 Syntactic computation of Belsy(Ψ)
Let Ψ be an epistemic state represented by a partially
ordered belief base Σ, we now present the mapping
from Σ to Belsy(Ψ). The computation of the corre-
sponding belief set Belsy(Ψ) is more complex and it is
closely linked to the ability of making syntactic infer-
ences from Σ in order to deduce the agent’s current
beliefs. This involves the definition of a partial pre-
order between consistent subsets of Σ, denoted by C
and we generate a partial pre-order between consistent
subsets of Σ using Σ described in definition 2. or
Definition 9 Let C,C′ ∈ C: C C,w C′ iff {φ′ : φ′ 6∈
C′} Σ,w {φ : φ 6∈ C},
Intuitively, C is preferred to C′ if the best formulas
outside C are less preferred than the best formulas
outside C′. We denote by CONSw(Σ) the set of pre-
ferred consistent subsets of Σ with respect to C,w,
namely: CONSw(Σ) = min(C,C,w).
Example 10 We come back to example 3, the follow-
ing array illustrates the set of consistent subsets of Σ:
Ci {φ ∈ Ci} Min({φ 6∈ Ci},Σ)
C0 ∅ b ∧ c→ ¬a, d→ a
C1 b ∧ c→ ¬a b→ a, d→ a
C2 b→ a b ∧ c→ ¬a, d→ a
C3 d→ a b ∧ c→ ¬a,
C4 b→ a, b ∧ c→ ¬a d→ a
C5 b→ a, d→ a b ∧ c→ ¬a
C6 b ∧ c→ ¬a, d→ a b→ a
C7 b→ a, b ∧ c→ ¬a, d→ a ∅
According to the definition of C,w, we obtain the par-
tial pre-order graphically represented by Figure 6.
Figure 6: Representation of C, w
C7
C1 C4C6
C5 = C3 C0 = C2
The syntactic definition of Bel is:
Belse[Ψ] =
∨
C∈Consw(Σ)
C.
This means that the syntactic inference can be defined
as: φ is inferred from Σ iff ∀C ∈ CONSs, C ∪ ¬φ is
inconsistent.
Theorem 2 Let Ψ be the epistemic state, let ◦sy⊲ and
◦se⊲ be the syntactic and semantic revision operators
stemming from the history of observations, and ◦syπ
and ◦seπ be the syntactic and semantic possibilistic re-
vision operators. The following result holds:
• Belsy(Ψ ◦sy⊲ µ) ≡ Belse(Ψ ◦se⊲ µ),
• Belsy(Ψ ◦syπ µ) ≡ Bel
se(Ψ ◦seπ µ).
We illustrate this theorem with an example:
Example 11 Let Ψ be the epistemic state defined in
example 4 where the revision by µ = d leads, to the
belief set Belse(Ψ ◦se⊲ µ) such that Mod(Bel
se(Ψ ◦se⊲
µ)) = {ω9, ω11, ω13}.
On the syntactic level, we can check that, since Σ ∪
{µ} ∪ U is consistent, that the preferred elements
for C,w, Consw(Σ ◦
sy
⊲ µ) is simply the subset com-
posed of all elements of Σ ◦sy⊲ µ. Namely we have
Consw(Σ◦sy⊲ µ) = {{b → a, b ∧ c → ¬a, d → a, d,
(b → a) ∨ s, (b ∧ c → ¬a) ∨ d, (d → a) ∨ d}} and
hence Mod(Consw) = {ω9, ω11, ω13}, as it is excepted.
6 Concluding discussion
Since in certain situations an agent faces incomplete
information and has to deal with partially ordered in-
formation, this paper proposed a semantic representa-
tion of an epistemic state by a partial pre-order on in-
terpretations as well as a syntactic representation by a
partially ordered belief base. The extension to partial
pre-orders of two revision strategies already defined for
total pre-orders are presented, and the equivalence be-
tween the representations is shown. We showed that
after a certain number of successive revisions the par-
tial pre-order convergences to a total pre-order.
In a future work, we have to investigate the proper-
ties of these revision operators and the presented ap-
proach could be generalized to the revision of a par-
tial pre-order by a partial pre-order, generalizing the
approach proposed in [3]. Moreover, in order to pro-
vide reversibility the encoding by polynomials of par-
tial pre-orders on interpretations and partially ordered
belief base could be investigated.
Another future work is to develop algorithms for com-
puting the belief set at the syntactical case, and to ap-
ply them in geographical information systems where
available information is often partially ordered.
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